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Background: Previous studies on informal patient payments have mostly focused on the magnitude and
determinants of these payments while the attitudes of health care actors towards these payments are less well
known. This study aims to reveal the attitudes of Hungarian health care consumers towards informal payments to
provide a better understanding of this phenomenon.
Methods: For the analysis, we use data from a survey carried out in 2010 in Hungary involving a representative
sample of 1037 respondents. We use cluster analysis to identify the main attitude groups related to informal
payments based on the respondents’ perception of and behavior related to informal payments. Multinomial logistic
regression is applied to examine the differences between these groups in terms of socio-demographic
characteristics, as well as past utilization and informal payments paid for health care services.
Results: We identified three main different attitudes towards informal payments: accepting informal payments,
doubting about informal payments and opposing informal payments. Those who accept informal payments (mostly
young or elderly people, living in the capital) consider these payments as an expression of gratitude and perceive
them as inevitable due to the low funding of the health care system. Those who doubt about informal payments
(mostly respondents outside the capital, with higher education and higher household income) are not certain
whether these payments are inevitable, perceive them as similar to corruption rather than gratitude, and would
rather use private services to avoid these payments. We find that the opposition to informal payments (mostly
among men from small households and low income households) can be explained by their lower ability and
willingness to pay.
Conclusions: A large share of Hungarian health care consumers has a rather positive attitude towards informal
payments, perceiving them as “inevitable due to the low funding of the health care system”. From a policy point-of
-view, the change of this consumer attitude will be essential to deal with these payments in addition to other
policy strategies.
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Informal payments for health care services present an
important and challenging policy issue in most of the
Central and Eastern European countries [1,2]. These
payments violate the transparency in the financing of
the health care systems and jeopardize the accountability
of the providers. They also lead to inefficient use of
health care resources [1-3] and inequalities in access to
health care services [4-6].
The definition of informal payments varies across the
literature and reflects cultural differences in the percep-
tion of informal payments [2,7,8]. However, authors
agree that these payments are unofficial, i.e. they are
outside the official payment channels (not registered by
the state and made without an official receipt of pay-
ment). Various types of informal payments can be
distinguished based on who initiates the payments (the
patient or the provider), who receives the payment
(medical staff, institution), who makes the payment (pa-
tient or relatives), what the nature of the payment is
(cash or in-kind), when the payment is made (given ex-
ante or ex-post), what the purpose/motivation of these
payments is (patient's gratitude, tip or fee for service)
[8]. Also the legal status of informal payments might dif-
fer across countries (whether it is explicitly forbidden by
the law). They can be legal (not forbidden or even per-
mitted by the law), or illegal (forbidden by law although
sometimes condoned by governments) [8].
Overall, informal payments are seen as a rather com-
plex phenomenon interrelated with different socio-
cultural, legal-ethical and economic factors in a country.
These factors have been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature [1,2,6,7,9-11]. According to the socio-cultural ex-
planation, informal payments are considered as a tip and
expression of patient’s gratitude (e.g. [4,7]). Based on the
legal-ethical considerations, the existence of informal
payments can be explained by the lack of control and ac-
countability of governance structures [7]. The economic
explanation mostly refers to the shortage of resources in
the health care sector, low salaries of physicians and the
existence of an informal market for services provided
with better quality (e.g. [7,12,13]). However, the differen-
tiation between these factors is rather difficult due to the
“shadow” nature of the informal payments (i.e. the
returns of informal payments cannot be measured and
they are not compellable). Also, these factors might differ
across countries. In low and middle income countries (e.g.
Ukraine, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia), in-
formal payments are an important source of health care fi-
nancing [9,14]. While in Central Europe (in Hungary for
example), informal payments mostly contribute to the sal-
ary of health care personnel [15].
Most of the empirical studies on informal patient
payments aim to estimate the magnitude of thesepayments and their determinants, while there is less sci-
entific evidence on the perception of health care actors
related to these payments [8,16]. To be able to under-
stand why informal payments are widespread, the
perceptions and attitude of health care consumers to-
wards these payments are one of the key factors (besides
factors on the provider side). Thus, evidence on this
issue may support policy making related to the eradica-
tion of informal payments.
In this study, we address the issue of informal payments,
defined as unofficial cash or in-kind payments given to the
health care personnel, in Hungary where such payments
are widespread, especially in hospital care [6,16,17]. The
aim of the study is to examine the perceptions of Hungar-
ian health care consumers related to informal payments.
For the analysis, we use data from a household survey
carried out in 2010 in Hungary on a country-representative
sample of 1037 respondents. We use cluster analysis to
identify the main attitude groups related to informal
payments. We also use multinomial logistic regression to
examine the differences between these groups in terms of
socio-demographic characteristics, as well as past utilization
and informal payments for hospital services. Although we
focus on Hungary, our results are relevant for other coun-
tries where informal payments are widespread.
Background: informal payments in Hungary
In Hungary, some authors consider informal payments as
the heritage of the socialist system while others argue that
these payments existed even before the socialist period
[18]. However, health care consumers are still regularly
paying informally for health care services even 20 years
after the fall of the communist regime. According to the
results of a previous study, in 2007, 9% of the patients paid
informally for their last visit to a GP (€2 on average), 14%
paid informally for specialist care (€35 on average), and
50% paid informally for hospitalization (€58 on average)
[17]. Informal payments are most widespread in case of
gynecology visits, delivery and for surgical admissions
[17,19].
The attitude of the Hungarian government towards in-
formal payments has been rather controversial during
the last decades. On the one hand, several Ministry
Committees and policy measures have addressed the
problem of informal payments in Hungary (including
media campaigns against informal payments, the in-
crease of the salaries in the public sector as well as the
introduction of co-payments for health care services).
However, despite these arrangements, there were no sig-
nificant changes regarding the magnitude of these
payments during this period [16,17]. On the other hand,
the national regulations do not explicitly forbid informal
patient payments. Since July 2012, the Labor Code in
Hungary prohibits receiving informal payments. However,
Baji et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:62 Page 3 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/62the employer has the right to dispense the employees from
this decree. Thus, in a way, the government tolerates in-
formal payments in the health care sector. The reason for
this tolerance might be that informal payments contribute
to the system funding by complementing the income of
health care personnel [2,3,9].
This idea is supported by the standpoint of the medical
profession, as the Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical
Chamber declares that “. . .one of the explanations of the
existence of informal payments is the low salary of the
physicians and the dysfunction of the health care system.”
([20], quoted in [7]). The studies show that indeed, in
Hungary, informal payments are paid to the medical
staff and contribute to their salary [16,19]. According to
the estimations of Gaál et al. (2006), physicians may
have earned between 60% and 236% of their net official
income from informal payments. However, they also
point out that these payments are unequally distributed
among physicians: 5% of them receive 60% of the infor-
mal payments [16]. This can imply that beneficiaries of
informal payments might have the power to block im-
portant changes in the health care system to maintain
the status quo.
Regarding the consumer side, the literature on Hungary
suggests that informal payments are not only the expres-
sion of gratitude of health care consumers, but a kind
of “fee for service” to receive better quality, quicker
access and more attention [7]. More precisely, health
care consumers pay informally because they are afraid that
they will have less chance to obtain these services and
benefits if they do not pay informally to the health care
personnel [6,7,18]. Gaál and McKee (2004) consider infor-
mal payments as a reaction to the “declining” performance
in the health care system [12]. According to the authors,
dissatisfied health care consumers, who have no possibility
to satisfy their needs elsewhere or cannot openly com-
plain, are using informal channels (such as informal
payments) to obtain the care they desire.
Methods
Data collection
The data used in the analysis, were collected in July 2010
in a household survey among adult citizens (age 18+),
carried out as a part of an international research project.
The objective of the survey was to collect data on past
payments for health care services during the last 12
months, attitudes towards informal payments, preferences
and willingness to pay for health care services. In
Hungary, the survey was conducted via face-to-face indi-
vidual interviews at the respondents’ home. The aim was
to have 1000 effective interviews per country that present
samples representative for the country.
The respondents were identified based on a multi-
staged random probability method. During the firststage, sampling points in the country were selected.
Within each of the seven regions in Hungary, the cities,
towns and villages (rural area) included in the survey,
were selected at random proportionally to regional and
urban/rural characteristics of the population. In particu-
lar, the number of sampling points in the rural areas was
calculated based on the ratio of the urban/rural popula-
tion in the country. As the objective was to have 7–8
interviews per sampling point, in total, 132 sampling
points (43 in rural area) have been included (36 in Cen-
tral Hungary, 14 in Central Transdanubia, 13 in West
Transdanubia, 15 in South Transdanubia, 16 in North
Hungary, 19 in North Lowland and 17 in South Lowland).
In the second stage, to select addresses/households of po-
tential respondents, the random route method was used.
For each sampling point, a starting point and direction
were determineda. In the third stage, the selection of the
respondent within the selected household was done using
the “last birthday” principle. In this procedure, the inter-
viewer asked to speak to the adult member of the house-
hold who had the last birthday. The last-birthday method
is based on the assumption that the assignment of
birthdates is a random process and also every household
member has an equal chance of being selected (for further
information see [21,22]).
As mentioned before, the aim was to have 1000
completed interviews (7–8 per sampling point). Thus,
when the selection of a respondent at the third stage
failed (including the cases when the household or the re-
spondent with the last birthday in the household could
not be successfully contacted after 3 attempts, or the re-
spondent refused or was unavailable to take part in an
interview), a replacing respondent was identified in the
same sampling point following the second and third
stage of the selection method (i.e. random route method
to identify the household and the last birthday principle
to identify the respondent within the household).
The interviews were carried out face-to-face by quali-
fied and experienced interviews who attended a training
prior to the survey to clarify the fieldwork standards and
the specificities of the questionnaire. A high number of
interviewers (130) were involved in the survey to avoid
the interviewer bias that might occur when one inter-
viewer carries out many interviews. Each interviewer
carried out 6–8 interviews.
Altogether, 1376 respondents were successfully con-
tactedb, out-of them 330 refused or were unable to par-
ticipate in the survey. This resulted in a response rate
(calculated as interviewed/successfully contacted res-
pondents) of 76%. The final sample for Hungary contains
data for 1037 respondentsc, 104–285 interviews per region
in 132 sampling points. After the data collection, about
10% of all respondents interviewed were re-contacted ei-
ther by telephone or in person to verify that the interview
Table 1 Statements used in the cluster analysis
Do you AGREE with the following statements? (yes/somewhat/no)
• Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are similar
to corruption.
• Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption.
• Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are an
expression of gratitude.
• Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are an expression of
gratitude.
• Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical
staff are INEVITABLE because of the low funding of the health care
sector.
• Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff,
should be ERADICATED.
Do the following statements apply to YOU PERSONALLY?
(yes/somewhat/no)
• I will feel UNCOMFORTABLE if I leave the physician's office without a
gratitude cash payment or gift in kind.
• I would RECOGNISE the hint of physicians or medical staff for an
informal cash payment or a gift in kind.
• I will REFUSE to pay if a physician or medical staff ask me to pay
informally for a medical service.
• I will PREFER to use private medical services if I have to pay
informally for public medical services.
• If I have SERIOUS PROBLEMS with my health, I will be ready to pay as
much as I have in order to get better medical services.
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indicate problems.
All respondents were asked for an informed consent at
the start of the interview. The survey targeted the gen-
eral public (not specific patient groups) and had the
form of a consumer survey. Therefore, there was no
need for an approval of an ethics committee (also there
was no experiment on patients). The data collection was
performed in accordance with the ICC/ESOMAR Inter-
national Code of Marketing and Researchd.
The questionnaire
The questionnaire included questions about the res-
pondents’ perception of informal payments as well as
questions about the respondents’ perceived behavior
related to informal payments. Informal payments were
defined at the outset of the questionnaire as consisting of
informal cash payments (such as gratitude cash payments
or under-the-table cash payments) and gifts in kind for re-
ceiving medical services. It was specified in the questions
that such payments can be given to physicians, medical
staff or other personnel in health care facilities.
The exact wording of the questions used in our ana-
lysis is presented in Table 1 (a copy of the relevant parts
of the questionnaire is provided in the Additional file 1).
Questions in the first block (see Table 1) inquire whether
the respondents agree with six different statements about
informal payments. In particular, respondents were asked
whether they consider informal payments as a form of
corruption or as gratitude, whether they accept informal
payments as inevitable because of the low health care
funding, and whether they agree that these payments
should be eradicated. The questions in the second block
in Table 1 inquire the respondents whether five statements
on behavior related to informal payments apply to them
personally.
Other parts of the questionnaire included questions on
the utilization and payments for physician services (in-
cluding any physician in primary and outpatient special-
ist care both in the public and private sector excluding
dentists) and hospitalization (including 1 day surgery as
well as longer hospitalizations) during the preceding 12
months. Respondents were also asked about their atti-
tude towards informal payments (cash payments and
gifts in kind given to the health care personnel) and
about socio-demographic characteristics.
Analysis
We divide the respondents into attitude groups based
on their individual responses. By applying the method of
hierarchical cluster analysis with the Ward method, we
explore the pattern of the respondents’ answers. The
Ward method ensures homogeneity and relatively equal
size of the groups. In a cluster analysis, the number ofclusters is subjective. However, there are statistical tests,
which can be used as a guidance to identify the “opti-
mal” number of clusters. The two most frequently ap-
plied statistical tests - Duda-Hart test and Calanski
Harabas test, provide us with a test on each stage of the
clustering for deciding on whether or not the splitting of
a cluster is justifiable [23,24]. In our analysis, both tests
suggest 2 clusters as the best option (one group for and
one group against informal payments). However, we de-
cide to use 3 clusters, as we find it interesting to study
the differences within the group of those who are against
informal payments. We determined the final clusters
using k-centered clustering with 3 groups (setting
starting points as random 3 observations). Differences
between the variables are calculated using the method of
Euclidean-distance. We use ANOVA to test whether the
clusters significantly differ from each other in terms of
the variables used in the cluster analysis.
After the formation of the three groups, we apply
multinomial logistic regression to examine the associ-
ation between socio-demographic characteristics and
cluster memberships. We estimate two models. In the
first one, we use the cluster indicator (Group = 1,2,3) as
a dependent variable and socio-demographic characteristics
(such as age, gender, education of the respondent, loga-
rithm of the monthly net household income, size of the
household, place of residence of the household) as explana-
tory variables. In the second model, we also include past
Table 2 Statements included in the cluster analysis presented by clusters
Group 1 2 3 Total
N 311 316 297 924
I will feel UNCOMFORTABLE if I leave the physician's office without a gratitude
cash payment or gift in kind.
1 2 3 Total
No 170 (54.7%) 214 (67.7%) 252 (84.8%) 636 (68.8%)
Somewhat 72 (23.2%) 50 (15.8%) 30 (10.1%) 152 (16.5%)
Yes 69 (22.2%) 52 (16.5%) 15 (5.1%) 136 (14.7%)
I would RECOGNISE the hint of physicians or medical staff for an informal cash
payment or a gift in kind.
1 2 3 Total
No 37 (11.9%) 30 (9.5%) 57 (19.2%) 124 (13.4%)
Somewhat 72 (23.2%) 67 (21.2%) 74 (24.9%) 213 (23.1%)
Yes 202 (65.0%) 219 (69.3%) 166 (55.9%) 587 (63.5%)
I will REFUSE to pay if a physician or medical staff ask me to pay informally for
a medical service.
1 2 3 Total
No 134 (43.1%) 67 (21.2%) 49 (16.5%) 250 (27.1%)
Somewhat 85 (27.3%) 88 (27.8%) 51 (17.2%) 224 (24.2%)
Yes 92 (29.6%) 161 (50.9%) 197 (66.3%) 450 (48.7%)
I will PREFER to use private medical services if I have to pay informally for
public medical services.
1 2 3 Total
No 171 (55.0%) 3 (0.9%) 212 (71.4%) 386 (41.8%)
Somewhat 76 (24.4%) 68 (21.5%) 70 (23.6%) 214 (23-2%)
Yes 64 (20.6%) 245 (77.5%) 15 (5.1%) 324 (35.1%)
If I have SERIOUS PROBLEMS with my health, I will be ready to pay as much as
I have in order to get better medical services.
1 2 3 Total
No 27 (8.7%) 23 (7.3%) 119 (40.1%) 169 (18.3%)
Somewhat 67 (21.5%) 87 (27.5%) 123 (41.4%) 277 (30.3%)
Yes 217 (69.8%) 206 (65.2%) 55 (18.5%) 478 (51.7%)
Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are similar to
corruption.
1 2 3 Total
No 163 (52.4%) 7 (2.2%) 12 (4.0%) 182 (19.7%)
Somewhat 127 (40.8%) 105 (33.2%) 73 (24.6%) 305 (33.0%)
Yes 21 (6.8%) 204 (64.6%) 212 (71.4%) 437 (47.3%)
Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption. 1 2 3 Total
No 237 (76.2%) 79 (25.0%) 61 (20.5%) 377 (40.8%)
Somewhat 68 (21.9%) 112 (35.4%) 91 (30.6%) 271 (29.3%)
Yes 6 (1.9%) 125 (39.6%) 145 (48.8%) 276 (29.9%)
Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are an expression of
gratitude.
1 2 3 Total
No 17 (5.5%) 125 (39.6%) 157 (52.9%) 299 (32.4%)
Somewhat 86 (27.7%) 134 (42.4%) 117 (39.4%) 337 (36.5%)
Yes 208 (66.9%) 57 (18.0%) 23 (7.7%) 288 (31.2%)
Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude. 1 2 3 Total
No 7 (2.3%) 53 (16.8%) 95 (32.0%) 155 (16.8%)
Somewhat 47 (15.1%) 138 (43.7%) 141 (47.5%) 326 (35.3%)
Yes 257 (82.6%) 125 (39.6%) 61 (20.5%) 443 (47.9%)
Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are
INEVITABLE because of the low funding of the health care sector.
1 2 3 Total
No 51 (16.4%) 137 (43.4%) 180 (60.6%) 368 (39.8%)
Somewhat 117 (37.6%) 90 (28.5%) 80 (26.9%) 286 (31.0%)
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Table 2 Statements included in the cluster analysis presented by clusters (Continued)
Yes 144 (46.3%) 89 (28.2%) 37 (12.5%) 270 (29-2%)
Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff, should
be ERADICATED.
1 2 3 Total
No 128 (41.2%) 15 (4.7%) 15 (5.1%) 158 (17.1%)
Somewhat 130 (41.8%) 79 (25.0%) 58 (19.5%) 267 (28.9%)
Yes 53 (17.0% 222 (70.3%) 224 (75.4%) 499 (54.0%)
Baji et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:62 Page 6 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/62utilization and informal payments for physician or hospital
services as explanatory variables. To examine the effect
of past utilization and payments, we formulated three
different groups for each service (i.e. visit to physician
or hospitalization): those who did not use the service
during the last 12 months; those who used the service
but did not pay informally; those who used the service
and paid informally. To define these groups, in the re-
gression analysis, we include two indicators per service:
(1) for not using a given service and (2) for using the
services and paying informally. The categories that refer
to using a given services and not paying informally are
taken as reference categories.
Results
Altogether, 924 persons gave valid answers to all questions
in Table 1 and were classified into three groups (following
the procedure described in the method section): Group 1
consists of 311 members, Group 2 with 316 members and
group 3 with 297 members. Table 2 presents the
characteristics of the three groups based on the variablesTable 3 ANOVA test of the statements included in the cluster
Statements
I will feel UNCOMFORTABLE if I leave the physician's office without a g
cash payment or gift in kind
I would RECOGNISE the hint of physicians or medical staff for an inform
payment or a gift in kind.
I will REFUSE to pay if a physician or medical staff ask me to pay inform
a medical service.
I will PREFER to use private medical services if I have to pay informally
public medical services.
If I have SERIOUS PROBLEMS with my health, I will be ready to pay as m
I have in order to get better medical services.
Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are similar to
corruption.
Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption.
Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are an expres
gratitude.
Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are an expression of grati
Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical sta
INEVITABLE because of the low funding of the health care sector.
Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff, s
be ERADICATED.used in the cluster analysis. According to the results of
ANOVA analysis (Table 3) the groups significantly differ
in terms of all variables used in the cluster analysis.
Results of the cluster analysis
Regarding the perceptions of informal payments, most
of the respondents in Group 2 and Group 3 agree (65%
and 71% respectively) or somewhat agree (33% and 25%
respectively), that informal cash payments to physicians
and medical staff are similar to corruption. Respondents
in Group 1 either do not agree (52%) or only somewhat
agree (41%) with this statement.
In Group 1, most of the respondents agree (67%) or
somewhat agree (28%) that informal cash payments to
physicians and medical staff are an expression of grati-
tude. Most of the respondents in Groups 2 and 3 some-
what agree (42% and 39%) or do not agree (40% and
53%) with this statement.
The results are similar regarding gifts in kind. How-
ever, in general, the shares of those who agree that gifts
in kind given to physicians and medical staff are similaranalysis
1 2 3 ANOVA
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) F (p)
ratitude 0.68 (0.82) 0.49 (0.76) 0.20 (0.51) 33.93 (0.000)
al cash 1.53 (0.70) 1.60 (0.66) 1.37 (0.79) 8.40 (0.000)
ally for 0.86 (0.84) 1.30 (0.80) 1.50 (0.76) 49.81 (0.000)
for 0.66 (0.80) 1.77 (0.45) 0.34 (0.57) 449.50 (0.000)
uch as 1.61 (0.64) 1.58 (0.62) 0.78 (0.74) 148.42 (0.000)
0.54 (0.62) 1.62 (0.53) 1.67 (0.55) 391.09 (0.000)
0.26 (0.48) 1.15 (0.79) 1.28 (0.78) 195.03 (0.000)
sion of 1.61 (0.59) 0.78 (0.73) 0.55 (0.64) 224.37 (0.000)
tude. 1.80 (0.45) 1.23 (0.72) 0.89 (0.72) 160.73 (0.000)
ff are 1.30 (0.73) 0.85 (0.83) 0.52 (0.71) 80.67 (0.000)
hould 0.76 (0.72) 1.66 (0.57) 1.70 (0.56) 226.10 (0.000)
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and 50% respectively) compared to cash payments (7%,
65% and 71%). The shares of those who agree that gifts
in kind given to physicians and medical staff are an ex-
pression of gratitude are higher in all groups (83%, 40%
and 21%) compared to cash payments (67%, 18%, 8%).
Most of the respondents in Group 1 agree (46%) or
somewhat agree (38%) that informal cash payments and
gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are inevit-
able because of the low funding of the health care sector.
Group 2 is rather divided regarding this question, most
of the respondents do not agree (43%), while 29% and
28% somewhat agree or agree with this statement. In
Group 3, most of the respondents do not agree (61%) or
somewhat agree (27%) with this statement.
In Group 1, most of the respondents somewhat agree
(42%) or agree (41%) that cash or gifts in kind given in-
formally to physicians and medical staff, should be
eradicated. However, Group 2 and 3 are more likely to
agree with this statement (in Group, 70% agree and 25%
somewhat agree while in Group 3, these shares are 75%
and 20%).
Regarding the respondents’ perceived behavior towards
informal payments, respondents in Group 3 are less
likely to feel uncomfortable when leaving the physician's
office without a gratitude cash payment or gift in kind
(85% would not feel uncomfortable) compared to
Groups 1 and 2 (55% and 68% respectively). Groups 1
and 2 are more likely to feel uncomfortable in this situ-
ation (in Group 1 22% would feel uncomfortable, and
17% in Group 2) compared to Group 3, where only 5%
would feel uncomfortable. Respondents in Group 3 are
also less likely to recognize the hint of physicians or
medical staff for an informal cash payment or a gift in
kind (19% would not recognize such hint) compared to
the Groups 1 and 2 (12% and 10% respectively).
Respondents in Group 1 are less likely to refuse to pay if
a physician or medical staff ask them to pay informally
for a medical service (43% would not refuse to pay)
compared to Groups 2 and 3 (21% and 17% respect-
ively). Respondents in Group 2 are more likely to prefer
to use private services to avoid paying informally (78%
would use private services), while Group 3 is less likely
to prefer to use private services (only 5% would use).
This share is 21% in Group 2. Respondents in Group 3
are less likely to be ready to pay as much as they have in
order to get better medical services in case of serious
health problems, 40% would not be ready to pay as
much as they have, compared to 9% and 7% in Groups 1
and 2 respectively.
Based on the above characteristics of the three groups,
we define Group 1 as accepting informal payments, Group
2 as doubting about informal payments and Group 3 as
opposing informal payments.Results of the multinomial logistic regression
Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents
are presented in Table 4 separately for the three attitude
groups, i.e. for those who accept (Group 1), doubt
(Group 2) and oppose (Group 3) informal payments re-
spectively. The results of the multinomial logistic regres-
sion models are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In particular,
Table 5 shows the predicted probability of belonging to
each attitude groups. Table 6 presents the original and
estimated cluster memberships. In the first model (where
only socio-demographic features are included as inde-
pendent variables), 43.5% of the cases are well predicted.
In the extended model (where indicators of past utilization
and past informal payments per services are also included
as independent variables), 47.1% of the cases are predicted
correctly.
The probability of belonging to Group 1 (accepting in-
formal patient payments) is significantly higher for those
who are under the age of 35 (by 8% points), or above 60
(by 9% points). This probability is significantly higher
also for those who are living in the capital (by 12%
points), however, significantly lower for those who are
living in a village (by 8% points). Tertiary education also
increases the probability of belonging to this group by
10% points. The probability of belonging to Group 2
(doubting informal patient payments) is significantly
higher for women (by 6% points), at the same time, sig-
nificantly lower for those who are either living in the
capital (by 17% points) or have finished primary educa-
tion (by 12% points).The probability of belonging to
Group 3 (opposing informal patient payments) is signifi-
cantly higher for men (by 7% points), while each add-
itional household member decreases the probability of
belonging to this group by 3% points.
When we include the indicators of past utilization and
past informal payments for health care services in the
model, we observe that these variables explain group
memberships very well. Those who visited a physician
during the last 12 months and paid informally for this
type of service, are more likely to belong to Group 1 that
mostly accepts informal payments (the probability
increases by 27% points), and are less likely to belong to
Group 3 that mostly opposes informal payments (the
probability decreases by 22% points). Those who paid in-
formally for hospitalization during the last 12 months
are also less likely to belong to Group 3 (the probability
decreases by 16% points). However, those who were not
hospitalized during the last 12 month, are more likely to
belong to Group 2 that has doubts about informal
payments (the probability increases by 9% points).
Socio-demographic characteristics of those respondents,
who were not classified due to missing responses, are also
presented in Table 4. They are significantly older, more fre-
quently women, finished primary education, and have a
Table 4 Socio-demographic characteristics by clusters
Group 1 2 3 Total Missing
N 311 316 297 924 113
Socio- demographic characteristics
Age group
<35 104 (33.4%)* 100 (31.7%) 87 (29.3%) 291 (31.5%) 36 (31.9%)
35-59 119 (38.3%)** 148 (46.8%) 130 (43.8%) 397 (43.0%) 33 (29.2%)***
≥60 88 (21.9%)*** 68 (18.0%)*** 80 (26.9%) 236 (25.5%) 44 (38.9%)***
Gender
Man 144 (46.3%) 140 (44.3%)** 151 (50.8%) 435(47.1%) 46 (40.7%)
Woman 167 (53.7%) 176 (55.7%)** 146 (49.2%) 489(52.9%) 67 (59.3%)***
Residence
Village 71 (22.8%)*** 101 (32.0%) 92 (31.0%) 264 (28.6%) 39 (34.5%)
Town 166 (53.4%) 182 (57.6%)*** 149 (50.2%) 497 (53.8%) 55 (48.7%)
Capital 74 (23.8%)*** 33 (10.4%)*** 56 (18.9%) 163 (17.6%) 19 (16.8%)
Education
Primary 64 (20.6%) 40 (12.7%)*** 71 (23.9%) 175 (18.9%) 35 (31.0%)***
Secondary/vocational 197 (63.3%) 233 (73.7%)*** 198 (66.6%) 628 (68.0%) 67 (59.3%)**
Tertiary 50 (16.1%)*** 43 (13.6%)** 28 (9.4%) 121 (13.1%) 11 (9.7%)
Health
Very bad. bad 43 (13.8%) 28 (8.9%)** 38 (12.8%) 109 (11.8%) 14 (12.4%)
Fair 82 (26.4%) 79 (25.0%)** 90 (30.3%) 251 (27.2%) 33 (29.2%)
Good 98 (31.5%) 134 (42.4%)*** 88 (29.6%) 320 (34.6%) 35 (31.0%)
Very Good. excellent 88 (28.3%) 75 (23.7%) 81 (27.3%) 244 (26.4%) 31 (27.4%)
Age
Mean 46.4 44.6*** 47.0 46.0 49.4*
SD (18.4) (15.9) (17.2) (17.2) (19.96)
Income (HUF), 1 EUR ~ 285 HUF
Mean 164 727** 188 230*** 152 787 168 697 157 021***
SD (81 808) (100 351) (100 081) (95 441) (79 959)
N 301 299 292 892 105
Household
Mean 2.6 2.9*** 2.5 2.7 2.5
SD (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.5)
Past utilization and payments
Physician visit
N 310 315 296 921 112
Not visited 60 (19.4%) 55 (17.5%) 61 (20.6%) 176 (19.1%) 31 (27.7%)**
Visited and not paid 158 (51.0%)*** 211 (67.0%)** 214 (72.3%) 583 (63.3%) 69 (61.6%)
Visited and paid 92 (29.7%)*** 49 (15.6%)*** 21 (7.1%) 162 (17.6%) 12 (10.7%)*
Hospitalization
N 311 315 297 923 113
Not hospitalized 228 (73.3%)*** 258 (81.9%) 239 (80.5%) 725 (78.6%) 92 (81.4%)
hospitalized not paid 34 (10.9%)** 27 (8.6%)*** 45 (15.2%) 106 (11.5%) 16 (14.2%)
hospitalized and paid 49 (15.8%)*** 30 (9.5%)*** 13 (4.4%) 92 (10.0%) 5 (4.4)**
stars indicate significant difference from the 3rd group in terms of mean (t test), or proportion (z-test).
in the case of “missing” group stars indicate significant difference from the Total.
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
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Table 5 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis
Model 1 Model 2
VARIABLES Pr(clust = 1) Pr(clust = 2) Pr(clust = 3 Pr(clust = 1) Pr(clust = 2) Pr(clust = 3)
age < 35 0.0754* −0.0367 −0.0387 0.0783* −0.0287 −0.0495
(1.889) (−0.993) (−1.030) (1.909) (−0.754) (−1.319)
age≥ 60 0.0848* −0.0474 −0.0374 0.0636 −0.0409 −0.0227
(1.920) (−1.154) (−0.923) (1.391) (−0.964) (−0.548)
gender: woman 0.0173 0.0568* −0.0741** 0.00993 0.0532 −0.0632*
(0.525) (1.750) (−2.260) (0.290) (1.595) (−1.899)
residence: capital 0.124*** −0.169*** 0.0455 0.121** −0.169*** 0.0472
(2.696) (−4.487) (0.999) (2.539) (−4.278) (1.016)
residence: village −0.0756** 0.0255 0.0500 −0.0866** 0.0241 0.0625
(−2.019) (0.678) (1.294) (−2.261) (0.625) (1.578)
education: primary 0.0578 −0.121*** 0.0632 0.0528 −0.114*** 0.0617
(1.249) (−2.963) (1.399) (1.097) (−2.677) (1.330)
education: tertiary 0.0964* −0.0234 −0.0730 0.0974* −0.0223 −0.0751
(1.825) (−0.483) (−1.499) (1.781) (−0.449) (−1.556)
health status: bad, very bad 0.0738 −0.0366 −0.0372 0.0472 −0.0299 −0.0172
(1.362) (−0.695) (−0.767) (0.836) (−0.543) (−0.331)
ln(income) −0.00711 0.0826** −0.0755** −0.0306 0.0863*** −0.0556*
(−0.229) (2.561) (−2.541) (−0.962) (2.599) (−1.874)
number of household members 0.00688 0.0216 −0.0284* 0.0116 0.0240 −0.0356**
(0.474) (1.522) (−1.955) (0.773) (1.636) (−2.413)
not visited physician - - - 0.0689 −0.0605 −0.00844
- - - (1.464) (−1.436) (−0.201)
visited physician and paid informally - - - 0.271*** −0.0491 −0.222***
- - - (5.340) (−1.053) (−5.914)
not hospitalized - - - −0.00551 0.0881* −0.0826
- - - (−0.103) (1.721) (−1.571)
hospitalized and paid informally - - - 0.0818 0.0790 −0.161***
- - - (0.998) (0.922) (−2.680)
Pr 0,3426 0,3272 0,3303 0,3424 0,3376 0,3200
Regression characteristics - - - - -
Observations 892 892 892 888 888 888
Pseudo R-squared 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0704 0.0704 0.0704
Chi2 test 77.34 77.34 77.34 137.3 137.3 137.3
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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who answered all questions presented in Table 1 and were
included in the analysis. According to the predictions of the
extended model (see Table 5) (including socio-demographic
features, as well as past utilization and payments for health
care services), 45% of those with missing responses would
belong to Group 3 (opposing informal payments).Discussion
In this study, we have identified three different attitude
groups of Hungarian health care consumers based on
their opinion and perceived behavior concerning infor-
mal payments. This section discusses the main findings
to obtain better insights in the consumers’ motivation to
make informal payments for health care services.
Table 6 Original and predicted cluster membership
Model1*
Cluster/Predicted cluster 1 2 3 Total_predicted Missing Total
1 107 (35,7%) 109 (36,3%) 85 (28,3%) 301 10 311
2 57 (19,2%) 171 (57,6%) 71 (23,9%) 299 17 316
3 76 (26,1%) 106 (36,4%) 110 (37,8%) 292 5 297
missing 30 (28,6%) 37 (35,2%) 38 (36,2%) 105 8 113
Model2** (extended model)
Cluster/predicted cluster 1 2 3 Total_predicted Missing Total
1 112 (37,3%) 98 (32,7%) 90 (30,0%) 300 11 311
2 61 (20,5%) 152 (51,2%) 84 (28,3%) 297 19 316
3 49 (16,8%) 88 (30,2%) 154 (52,9%) 291 6 297
missing 26 (25,0%) 31 (29,8%) 47 (45,2%) 104 9 113
Note: *43,5% of the cases the predictid cluster is equal to the original cluster, **47,1% of the cases the predicted cluster is equal to the original cluster.
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We find Group 1 – involving either young people or eld-
erly who predominantly live in the capital – to be the
most tolerant towards informal payments as they mostly
perceive these payments as inevitable due to the low
funding of the health care system. The perception and
attitude of this group corresponds with the “economic”
explanation of informal payments, which refers to the
shortage of resources in the health care sector, low salary
of physicians and the existence of informal market for
services with better quality [2,9,15].
Thus, one of the explanations for this attitude might
be the perceived low quality of health care services in
Hungary. Qualitative results show that health care
consumers are not satisfied with the performance of the
health care system, and associate the low quality with the
lack of financial and human resources in the Hungarian
health care system [25,26]. This perception might create a
motivation for health care consumers to pay informally
for health care services in order to obtain better care.
According to the theory of Gaál and McKee (2004), who
extend Hirschman’s theory of “Exit, Voice, Loyalty” on
the informal payments phenomenon, informal payments
can be interpreted as a reaction to the “declining” per-
formance in the health care system. Dissatisfied health
care consumers who have no possibility to satisfy their
needs elsewhere (exiting the system is not possible) or
cannot openly make complains (voice is not an option) are
using informal channels, such as payment or connections
to improve their situation, i.e. to assure better care [12].
The same idea is behind the theory of “Alternative Politics”,
which refers to the “do-it-yourself” approach adopted by
citizens to address their dissatisfaction with governmental
services and find other means (e.g. informal payments) of
satisfying their needs [27].
Another explanation for the tolerant attitude towards
informal payments observed in Group 1 is the perceivedlow salary of the health care personnel, which according
to the Group might legitimate the existence of informal
payments. The definition of informal payments in the
Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber –
presented in the background section - suggests that infor-
mal payments keep physicians working in public health
care institutions. Consequently, informal payments are an
indication of the solidarity of health care consumers with
the medical personnel. A similar finding was also reported
in a previous study in Hungary, where 70% of the
respondents agree or rather agree that the existence of in-
formal payments indicate that physicians are “underpaid”.
Also, 67% of the respondents in that study agreed or ra-
ther agreed that until physicians do not get proper salary
they have the right to accept informal payments [19]. This
may explain our finding that individuals in Group 1 con-
sider informal payments as inevitable and that they feel ra-
ther uncomfortable when leaving the physician's office
without gratitude cash payments or gifts in kind. They
would also not refuse to pay informally if asked by the
medical personnel.
Individuals in Group 1 do not consider informal
payments as a corruption practice, consequently, they
would not use private services either to avoid these pay-
ment. The explanation of this finding might be that the
national legislation itself, do not explicitly forbid these
payments (as mentioned in the background section).
Furthermore, the Ethical Codex of the Hungarian Med-
ical Chamber openly declares that these payments
“within certain limits are legal and legitimate” [20].
Group 2 – with individuals mostly living outside of
the capital, completed higher education, and having a
higher household income, doubts informal payments.
This group is divided regarding the statement that infor-
mal payments are inevitable because of the lack of
resources in the health care system. However, they def-
initely consider informal cash payments as a corruption
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these payments. This attitude group rather supports the
“legal-ethical explanation” of informal payments.
According to this explanation, informal payments are
rather the consequence of the lack of control and ac-
countability of the governance [16], than of the lack of
resources in the health care system. We also find that
individuals in this group are both willing to pay for their
health (they are the most ready to pay as much as they
can in case of a serious health problem) and able to pay
for health care services (since we find a significantly
higher household income in this group compared to
other groups). Thus, in their case, the extension of for-
mal payment channels or the development of the private
health care market might be an option to deal with in-
formal payments.
Group 3 (mostly men from small households and low
household income) is the least tolerant group towards
informal payments and it is least likely to accept to pay
informally for health care services as well. Individuals in
this group consider informal payments as a corruption
practice and do not agree that these payments are inevit-
able because of the low funding of the health care
system. Similar to Group 2, the attitudes of this group
correspond with the “legal-ethical explanation” of infor-
mal payments. However, our results suggest that this is
not the only explanation for the attitude of this group.
We find that although this group considers informal
payments as a corruption practice, they would not use
private services to avoid these payments. Besides, this is
the group where the least respondents accept to pay for
their health care in case of a serious health problem.
These findings might suggest that they are less willing to
pay for health care in general because either they object
to pay for health care services in any form (formal or in-
formal) or they are less able to pay for services (as we
find a significantly lower household income among this
group). Thus, they might be opposed to the increase in
private financing in health care and the extension of for-
mal payment channels. Since they are less likely to pay
informally, they might also experience discrimination in
the provision compared to those who accept informal
payments and pay informally (Group 1 and 2).
Comparison to previous studies
As we mentioned in the introduction, previous studies
on informal payments have mostly focused on the mag-
nitude of the payments. In a recent systematic literature
review, Stepurko et al. (2010) [8] identify only six studies
examining consumers or patients’ attitude towards infor-
mal payments in different countries (see [4,28-32])These
studies are rather divided regarding their conclusions,
namely the attitudes reported in these studies vary from
strongly negative to tolerant, depending on the motivationof the payment. Another six studies examine the percep-
tion of informal payments. Three studies report that infor-
mal patient payments are perceived as tradition and
gratuity [31,33,34], and two studies report that these
payments are perceived as illegal behavior and corruption
[35,36]. One study mentions both perceptions [4]. Similarly
to our findings, the above-mentioned studies also report
that consumers tolerate informal payments when these
payments are initiated by the patient, or can be explained
by the economic conditions (e.g. lack of resources, low sal-
ary of the physicians) (See e.g. [32,35]). In contrast to previ-
ous studies however, we use attitudes and perceptions to
identify attitude groups that prevail in a country and to
examine the characteristics of these groups. This enables
us to better understand the motivations of different atti-
tude groups in Hungary. The application of our analysis on
data from other countries could show the cross-country
relevance of our conclusions.
Discussion of the limitations
In this section, we highlight some limitations of our
study. The data collection was carried out via face-to
-face interviews. This reduces non-responses, as the
interviewer can guide the respondent [37]. However, in-
formal payments are a sensitive topic. Therefore, when
answering the questions on informal payments, some
respondents could feel uncomfortable and would give
socially desirable answers. Although we recognize that
the collection of sensitive data via a self-administrated
questionnaire has a higher potential to reduce this bias
[38,39], we opted for a face-to-face interview in our
survey to reduce the non-response. Altogether 113
respondents did not answer some questions and
therefore were excluded from the cluster analysis. To
address this issue we compared the socio-demographic
characteristics of this group to those respondents who
gave valid answers to identify significant differences be-
tween them.
Furthermore, we find that half of the respondents
(51%) agree (or rather agree) that informal payments are
an expression of gratitude, but at the same time consider
these payments similar to corruption. This might suggest
that respondents give inconsistent answers. However,
the same phenomenon is found in a previous study as
well [7]. Hungarian health care consumers often use the
term gratitude to explain the motivation behind infor-
mal payments, even though in most of the cases they
pay informally in order to receive a better quality care,
quicker access or more attention. One explanation of
this puzzle might be that in Hungary, the expression
“gratitude” is used to denominate informal payments.
Nevertheless, the Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical
Chamber also defines these payments as an expression
of gratitude.
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In this study, we have identified the main attitudes to-
ward informal patient payments among Hungarian health
care consumers: accepting informal payments, doubting
informal payments and opposing informal payments.
From a policy point of view, the attitude of the first
group is the most challenging, as they considers informal
payments as an expression of gratitude and at the same
time inevitable because of the low funding of the health
care system. This corresponds with the economic ex-
planation of informal payments, which is also enhanced
by the health care providers’ side in Hungary.
The behavior of the second group – those who doubt
informal payments - is more promising from a policy
point-of-view. They regard these payments as similar to
corruption and would use private services to avoid these
payments. Thus, in their case, the extension of formal
payment channels or the private market of services
might be an option to deal with informal payments, as
they are both willing and able to pay for health care
services.
We find that the reason behind the opposition to-
wards informal payments observed in the third group is
their lower acceptance and ability to pay for the
services, rather than the “unofficial nature” of these
payments. In their case, policy makers should focus on
equity issues as they might also experience discrimin-
ation in the provision compared to those who accept in-
formal payments and pay informally.
If the government wants to make a commitment to
fight against informal payments, one of the essential steps
should be the change of this positive attitude towards in-
formal payments found in this study. Until health care
consumers get the message both from the government
and from the health care personnel, that these payments
are acceptable and legitimate (moreover necessary), it can-
not be expected that tolerant attitude towards informal
payments will change. The tolerant attitude might change
if these payments would be strongly discouraged by the
government regulations. Also, they will be less acceptable
for the public if it is highlighted that informal payments
are not the solution to the wage problems for the majority
of the health care personnel as only a small group of
physicians benefit from these payments (these problems
require other solutions). On the contrary, informal
payments create adverse incentives for their beneficiaries,
which can be against the general policy objectives, and
they might have the power to block important changes in
health care system to maintain the status-quo [2].
We recognize however, that the change in public
attitudes will be only one step in policy strategies aiming
at the eradication of informal patient payments. It
should complement (rather than substitute) other im-
portant steps such as improving quality of and access topublic health care services, as well as securing sufficient
resources for the public health care sectors. Moreover,
the issue of informal payments cannot be addressed as a
separate problem of the health care system alone. Fun-
damental changes in and outside the health care system
are necessary to achieve appreciable results regarding
the eradication of these payments.Endnotes
a The household selected for the survey, was every
forth address on the left hand side of the street in urban
areas, turning left at intersections and, after reaching a
dead end, going back to the last crossing and further
proceeding at random. In a block-of-flats of up to four
floors, every fifth apartment household was selected,
counting from the first apartment on the left of the
ground floor. In cases of unsuitable household, the
interviewers approached the apartment next-door and
continued doing this until reaching a suitable household.
At that point, the interviews resume the standard step of
every fifth apartment. In a block-of-flats of 5 floors and
more, the selection was every tenth apartment. In rural
areas, every fourth inhabitable house on both sides of
the interviewer’s route was selected. In compounds of
several houses behind a common fence, the interviewer
had to select the fourth one from the left (counting from
the gate), or if there were less than four houses behind a
common fence, then the interviewer went out of the
common yard, counting the houses as if they were along
the street.
b In 178 cases the interviewer was not able to contact
the household (e.g. nobody was at home after 3 visits, or
the address was non-eligible - non-residential building,
nobody lives at this address, empty dwelling/s, building)
or was not able to contact the respondent who had the
last birthday in the household (the respondent was not
at home and the interviewer could not obtain appoint-
ment for a next visit).
c Out of the 1046 interviews completed, in 9 cases, the
interviews were discarded due to various deficiencies in
data collected, such as over 40% non-answered questions
or “don’t know” answers.
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